Can we say anything at all about it? Do we have to take it as a given, or can it be a legitimate "object" rational inquiry? (And do these questions even make sense?)
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Re: Existence
Tue, September 26, 2006 - 4:25 AMIt's a given when I wake up in the morning, that I exist and the world around me also exists independently of me. When I take a cup of coffee in my hands, the coffee is not a figment of my imagination. It is possible that we are all brains-in-a-vat, dreaming all this stuff. But I consider that possibility as unlikely due to the realization that everyone is on the same page when I drink that coffee. Again, this is not an air-tight proof, but a reasonable one. There are no absolute certainty and that is why the foundation of knowledge is based upon beliefs that are taken to be a given, starting with the belief of my own existence and an objective world.
My two cents... -
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Re: Existence
Thu, September 28, 2006 - 4:36 PMThanks for your thoughts thatisnotme. I guess my question isn't so much whether I (or my coffee cup) exists, but whether "existence as such" be rationally interrogated at all.
I suppose my question comes from a kind of WIttgensteinian perspective. I'm not convinced that speculations like "do I exist? does anything exist?" have any real semantic content. Assuming that existence is ontologically "prior" to or more "fundamental" than thinking (e.g., thinking beings are a subset of the set of all existing things), we can't just step outside of existence and see it/study it from afar.
But does that really mean anything we say about existence must necessarily be devoid of any real semantic content? Heidegger certainly wouldn't think so . . .
Hmm. Seems Wittgenstein wouldn't have taken Heidegger seriously, but I wonder how Heidegger (or other existentialists) would have responded to Wittgenstien's arguments about the limits of language & thought.
I wonder if it would go something like this:
W to H: Existence? Being? What are you talking about? Language can't go there and still make sense. Stop it
H to W: That "language can't go there" is the way in which Being presents itself to us; it is precisely in the inability of language to "go there" that the Being reveals its essential groundlessness.
W to H: You speak as if language really does have somewhere to go, as if something has been concealed behind an impeneterable veil. My point is that this way of looking at things is based on a "bewitchment of intellegence by means of language." You're really just talking nonsense.
H to W: You're quite right that we shouldn't consider Being some kind of "object" toward which our inquiry is directed. In a very real sense, then, Being "is not." But that "Being is not" is itself significant; indeed, it's the very way in which Being reveals itself to us.
And so on . . . ? -
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Re: Existence
Mon, October 9, 2006 - 5:01 PMI like it, interesting stuff. But I don't think Wittgenstein is proposing that we can't talk about existence due to the limits of language. Moreover, ackowledging the limits of language allows us to talk about it. He does not deny the existence of sensations or experiences or the ability for us to find ways to relate these to others. Wittgenstein purports that utterances have no objective meaning, only a meaning to someone in a context – there are no meta-languages. Our internal images, mental states or propositions are interpreted through a shared set of signs and concepts.
The finite limits of the human mind, and further to that the limits of communication, restricts our notion of reason and being 'rational' if we are aiming for some objectivity that transcend these limits. Yet reason alone can't make humans securely at home in their world, due to its very limits. Pascal, Wittgenstein and Hume would note that custom and folk knowledge, forms or ways of life, can accomplish the task of grasping a reality enough for us to be able to cope and operate. This kind of knowing the world in practice may remove the intellectual confidence that some philosophers aspire to, removing any doubt of falsefoods, but knowledge can only every be known within the bounds of that which is knowing it and any more is quite obviously unavailable.
But this does not stop us from painting pictures of what we see when we look at the world, or painting pictures of those pictures that we see - which is like representing through speech or the written word.To put it crudely, what counts is not what is true or right (in some sense independent of the community of language users), but what you can get others to accept or acknowledge. -
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Re: Existence
Sun, October 15, 2006 - 2:51 PMGreat stuff, Justin, thanks!
Hmm. Wondering if you can clarify a few things . . .
"But I don't think Wittgenstein is proposing that we can't talk about existence due to the limits of language. Moreover, ackowledging the limits of language allows us to talk about it."
How so? From a Wittgensteinian perspective, I don't see how acknowledging the limits of language would enable us to talk about existience in way that makes sense. Religious language may talk about existence, but religious language isn't necessarily "about" anything all, and it certainly doesn't consist of empirical propositions (despite the claims of fundamentalists), any more than poetry does.
"Our internal images, mental states or propositions are interpreted through a shared set of signs and concepts. "
Just kind of thinking out loud here . . . I'm not sure that W would say that our mental states, etc., are interpreted at all. By whom? Us? The little me inside of me? The little me inside of me inside of me?
"To put it crudely, what counts is not what is true or right (in some sense independent of the community of language users), but what you can get others to accept or acknowledge."
I'm just on the edge of agreeing with this, but a part of me feels it's too strong of an interpretation. I'm not sure Wittgenstein would say that an objective reality doesn't exit or doesn't matter, but rather that we can only attempt talk about it within localized language "situations" that are in no way commensurate with one another. As you said, there's no meta-language. And, moreover, there's no way to meaningfully talk about how language pictures states of affairs and, hence, no way of seeing what reality would look like if weren't mediated by language.
In any case, I'm not sure how the notion that "what counts . . . is what you can get others to accept" enables us to have a rational discussion about existence. -
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Re: Existence
Sun, October 15, 2006 - 9:39 PMWitty notes that many philosophical problems are “[m]isunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.” For the later Wittgenstein, many philosophical conundrums are dissolved by having a clear understanding of the inner workings of the language used, related to its pertinent context, and arranging the information and knowledge accessible to us in different patterns and perspectives. So, certain philosophical propositions are simply a misuse of language out of its context and the limits of its meaning, often not actually problems at all when framed differently. So, “Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of easily accessible wrong turnings.”
So, knowing the limits of language allows us to be aware of when we have twisted ourselves into a semantic knot that can be untied be reframeing, or ignoring a proposition or question. He isn't saying lets not try to understand the world and communicate it through language. Rather, he may be saying that we have no other option so lets do so with a better understanding of the tools with which we attempt such a task.
Our means of conveying our mental states, propositions etc. is interpreted by others who share a similar life world, reconciling what they see me doing/saying and what it correlates with. We do interpret what we see and hear which is seen clearly when we get things wrong: when he said 'turn left' he meant your left. I am not proposing W meant another layer between a sensation or mental state etc. and aforemention interpretation, as distinct level of experience.
But I think you are right, Witt wouldn't suggest that we interpret our own mental states etc. - "There are not meanings going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions; the language is itself the vehicle of thought”. But, we don't have to agree with everything Wittgenstein wrote and, strangely enough, there are different 'interpretations' of what he said.
And I agree with the point about W and an objective reality. But I do get the sense that W and other apparent 'anti-philosophers', wanted to counter the search for an objective meaning and understanding that many philosophers tried to find. And I agree with this notion, objective reality has an impact on me whether I know it or not... it matters: e.g. before TB was discovered we still died from it, even if I called it consumption - my knowing it as TB does not change the disease but it has changed how we treat it and affected my reality. So, objective reality does impact us whether we can discuss it 'rationally' or not. But our understanding of this reality does itself impact reality - whether we know how or not.
In short, "what counts . . . is what you can get others to accept" is a tongue in cheek way of saying that subjective visions of reality are objectively significant. This is not to say that objective reality does not matter. Rather, that to rationally talk about the world as it impacts on humans, and how humans impact on the world (as if the are separate), we need to include in our vision the subjective apprehension of the world. Again, this is not saying that there is no objective reality, but apprehending an objective reality includes accounting for subjective knowledge which can knowingly or unknowingly affect the world. -
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Re: Existence
Wed, October 25, 2006 - 3:05 AMAgain, terrific thoughts -- thank you.
Just a few thinking-out-loud responses . . .
"So, knowing the limits of language allows us to be aware of when we have twisted ourselves into a semantic knot that can be untied be reframeing, or ignoring a proposition or question. He isn't saying lets not try to understand the world and communicate it through language. Rather, he may be saying that we have no other option so lets do so with a better understanding of the tools with which we attempt such a task."
Yes, but when it comes to metaphysical matters, I think he questions our ability to develop better tools -- or even have tools in the first place. E.g., in the Tractatus, propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs within the world and cannot, therefore, address either the world itself or the relationship of the world to language. The later Wittgenstein, I think, admits that uses of language needn't be rational in order to occupy a meaningful place within our form(s) of life; but I don't think he have changed his position on the limits of rational inquiry.
"But I do get the sense that W and other apparent 'anti-philosophers', wanted to counter the search for an objective meaning and understanding that many philosophers tried to find."
I guess that, here, I read Wittgenstein through Kant -- he made epistemology more fundamental than ontology. I.e., there's no point in trying to talk about x when we don't even know whether or not it's possible to talk about x (at least in the ways in which we're used to talking about x). So, yes, I think W thought the search as it had so far been conducted was hopelessly naive. But this leads back to my original question -- if he'd given someone like Heidegger the time of day (which he wouldn't have, but I'm wondering if that's a fault, an arrogance, on W's part), might he have seen H's approach as a means of talking about x in a non-naive way (e.g., in a way which doesn't take for granted that we know what we mean by the phrase "talk about x") . . . ?
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Re: Existence
Mon, October 9, 2006 - 2:36 PMIf you mean can we discuss human views on our perceptions of existence, then I think we can, yes. It may or may not be meaningful outside of the conversation we have.