What is "faith"?

>>>When someone gets married, are they acting on faith? <<<<

Yes

>>>>Do people have faith in the truth of their political and moral views? <<<<

Yes

When you buy a can of soda you are going on faith that within that can there actually is soda.

Are you referring to this part Denny?

>>>>Will you answer me a question: "Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?"
Theaet. Of course.
Soc. And by wisdom the wise are wise?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And is that different in any way from knowledge?
Theaet. What?
Soc. Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?
Theaet. Certainly they are.
Soc. Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my
satisfaction-What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit
down, as at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of putting to us any questions
which he pleases. .. Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that
I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love of conversation? I only
want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.
Theod. The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that
you would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am
unused to your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off.
Soc. Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The
philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word
ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.
Theaet. Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if
make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me.
Soc. We will, if we can.
Theaet. Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from
Theodorus-geometry, and those which you just now mentioned-are
knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other
craftsmen; these, each and all of, them, are knowledge.
Soc. Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality
of your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one simple thing.
Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I
believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or science of making shoes?
Theaet. Just so.
Soc. And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of
making wooden implements?
Theaet. I do.
Soc. In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the
two arts?
Theaet. True.
Soc. But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we
wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or
sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?
Theaet. Perfectly right.
Soc. Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very trivial and obvious thing-for example, What is clay? and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be ridiculous?
Theaet. Truly.
Soc. In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming
that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of "clay," merely because we added "of the image-makers," or of any other workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not know the nature of it?
Theaet. He cannot.
Soc. Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?
Theaet. None.
Soc. Nor of any other science?
Theaet. No.
Soc. And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the
-question is, "What is knowledge?" and he replies, "A knowledge of
this or that."
Theaet. True.
Soc. Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the day, he might have said simply, that clay is moistened earth-what sort of clay is not to the point.
Theaet. Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the
question. You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion.
Soc. What was that, Theaetetus?
Theaet. Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen-there he stopped. Now as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.
Soc. And did you find such a class?
Theaet. I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.
Soc. Let me hear.
Theaet. We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are
made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we
compared to square figures and called square or equilateral
numbers;-that was one class.
Soc. Very good.
Theaet. The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and
every other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a
greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater,
and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;-all
these we compared to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.
Soc. Capital; and what followed?
Theaet. The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the
equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes;
and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to)
the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the former [i.e., with the so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear
measurement, but in the value of the superficial content of their
squares; and the same about solids.
Soc. Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the
praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false
witness.
Theaet. But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer
about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore
Theodorus is a deceiver after all.
Soc. Well, but if some one were to praise you for running, and to
say that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner-would the praise be any the less true?
Theaet. Certainly not.
Soc. And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a
matter, as just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men perfect in every way?
Theaet. By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection!
Soc. Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was
mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.
Theaet. I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light
the truth.
Soc. Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition.
Theaet. I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often,
when the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of anxiety. <<<<

or this part?

>>>>"Soc. ...What is knowledge?"-and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.
Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception.
Soc. Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should
express your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours, and see whether it is a true birth or a mere,
wind-egg:-You say that knowledge is perception?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important
doctrine about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras,
who has another way of expressing it, Man, he says, is the measure
of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the
non-existence of things that are not:-You have read him?
Theaet. O yes, again and again.
Soc. Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men?
Theaet. Yes, he says so.
Soc. A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to
understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very
cold?
Theaet. Quite true.
Soc. Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely,
cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is
cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?
Theaet. I suppose the last.
Soc. Then it must appear so to each of them?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. And "appears to him" means the same as "he perceives."
Theaet. True.
Soc. Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and
cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be
supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?
Theaet. Clearly.
Soc. In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but told the truth, his Truth, in secret to his own disciples.
Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?
Soc. I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name,
such as great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small
and the heavy light-there is no single thing or quality, but out of
motion and change and admixture all things are becoming relatively
to one another, which "becoming" is by us incorrectly called being,
but is really becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are
becoming. Summon all philosophers-Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry-Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of

Ocean whence sprang the gods, and mother Tethys,

does he not mean that all things are the offspring, of flux and
motion?
Theaet. I think so.
Soc. And who could take up arms against such a great army having Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous?
Theaet. Who indeed, Socrates?
Soc. Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which
will show that motion is the source of what is called being and
becoming, and inactivity of not-being and destruction; for fire and
warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and guardian of all
other things, are born of movement and friction, which is a kind of
motion;-is not this the origin of fire?
Theaet. It is.
Soc. And the race of animals is generated in the same way?
Theaet. Certainly.
Soc. And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but
preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?
Theaet. True.
Soc. And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and
improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul only means want of attention and study, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?
Theaet. True.
Soc. Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as
to the body?
Theaet. Clearly.
Soc. I may add, that breathless calm, stillness and the like waste
and impair, while wind and storm preserve; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go round in their orbits, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if they were chained up and their motions ceased, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down.
Theaet. I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his
meaning.
Soc. Then now apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend,
and first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in
your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them. And
you must not assign any place to it: for if it had position it would
be, and be at rest, and there would be no process of becoming.
Theaet. Then what is colour?
Soc. Let us carry the principle which has just been affirmed, that
nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that white, black, and
every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate
motion, and that what we call a colour is in each case neither the
active nor the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you quite certain that the several colours appear to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you?
Theaet. Far from it.
Soc. Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the same?
Theaet. The latter.
Soc. And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I
apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed; nor again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. The fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark.
Theaet. How? and of what sort do you mean?
Soc. A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here
are six dice, which are more by a half when compared with four, and
fewer by a half than twelve-they are more and also fewer. How can
you or any one maintain the contrary?
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?
Theaet. I should say "No," Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in
reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.
Soc. Capital excellent! spoken like an oracle, my boy! And if you
reply "Yes," there will be a case for Euripides; for our tongue will
be unconvinced, but not our mind.
Theaet. Very true.
Soc. The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this, and would -have knocked their arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles-whether they are consistent with each or not.
Theaet. Yes, that would be my desire.
Soc. And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is
plenty of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our
own thoughts, and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are? If I am not mistaken, they will be described by us as follows:-first, that nothing can become greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself-you would agree?
Theaet. Yes.
Soc. Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no
increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.
Theaet. Quite true.
Soc. Thirdly, that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without becoming and having become.
Theaet. Yes, truly.
Soc. These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a
case as this-if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and
taller than you, may within a year, without gaining or losing in
height, be not so tall-not that I should have lost, but that you would
have increased. In such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I have not become; for I could not have become without becoming, neither could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you follow me,Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now.
Theaet. Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by
the Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.
Soc. I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight
into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for
wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in
wonder. He was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child of Thaumas (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras?
Theaet. Not as yet.
Soc. Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the
hidden "truth" of a famous man or school.
Theaet. To be sure, I shall be very much obliged.
Soc. Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated
are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean: the people who believe
in nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not
allow that action or generation or anything invisible can have real
existence.
Theaet. Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable mortals. <<<<


Two simple questions Denny, first was that sufficient reference for now or did you have another part in mind when asking your question?

I wouldn't want to make a post so long that "uninitiated eyes" merely glaze over and retreat from learning even though there is definitely more to tell.

Second: Why make reference to this dialog as the question that forms the focus of investigation for this thread is not about the qualities and characteristics of knowledge but of faith?